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European views on the UK’s renegotiation: Romania, Denmark,
Belgium and Luxembourg
The success or failure of David Cameron’s planned renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership will depend to a large
extent on how the other 27 EU member states respond to his proposals. But how do countries across the EU view the
UK’s renegotiation? Building on a report published in 2014 by the German Council on Foreign Relations, EUROPP is
running a series of overviews of the renegotiation from each of the EU’s member states. Compiled by the LSE’s Tim
Oliver and written by authors based at universities and research institutions, the overviews will set out what discussion
– if any – there has been about the renegotiation and the wider views within each country on a potential Brexit. This
post is the third in the series and gives views from Romania, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg.
Romania: There is staunch opposition to restrictions on the free movement of people
Denmark: The Danish government is a firm supporter of UK demands, albeit with some caveats
Belgium: The Belgian view is that European challenges can only be tackled through deepening
European integration
Luxembourg: There is no enthusiasm in Luxembourg for treaty change
 
Romania: There is staunch opposition to restrictions on the free movement of people
Over the past year, political and public debates in Romania’s mass-media on the UK’s renegotiation
demands have focused mostly on the potential impact on the fundamental liberties secured by the
EU’s treaties. Particular attention has been paid to the freedom of movement across the EU as a right
which should not be overlooked or restricted in any way. This is regardless of the various reasons,
with UK debates and fears about Romanian and Bulgarian workers moving to the UK in search of
work being replaced over recent months by security concerns stemming from the Syrian refugee
influx towards western and northern Europe.
Except for a few specific topics, the Romanian public and authorities oppose Westminster’s declared intentions to
renegotiate more opt-out clauses from EU treaties. The UK’s renegotiation plans are viewed as another challenge to
be overcome or dealt with by Romania, which, having joined the EU in 2007, is still working to secure the economic
and political benefits of EU membership. Any attempts aimed at institutionalising national-driven, inward looking
policies, regardless of their source or nature, are seen as a direct threat to the difficult progress Romania has made in
connecting to the rest of the EU.
Similar opposition is shown to UK attempts to obtain further opt-outs from the economic and monetary dimensions of
the Union, a position which stems from Romania’s public support for the adoption of the euro (although Romania is
still far from meeting the targets required for formal adoption of the single currency). The only reforms the UK has
been pushing that Bucharest favours are an enhanced role for national parliaments and a more economically
dynamic and outward looking EU. In relation to the latter, Romania advocates an economic rapprochement to
countries in the Middle East and particularly with resource-rich Central Asia.
It should therefore come as no surprise that there is an explicit opposition to any future changes to in-work benefits
for EU workers in the UK. The Romanian press has extensively quoted sources in the German press covering
Chancellor Merkel’s statements that a UK exit from the EU would be preferable to limitations of the right to free
movement across the Union. This opinion is one strongly shared by the Romanian authorities and has been made
clear in various statements and positions, though with nuances (for instance, while the support expressed for an
unlimited freedom of movement was unequivocal, there was a focus on a responsible conduct in destination
countries, in all forms – in the context of the controversies in the UK about potential abuse of social assistance
systems by Romanians moving to Britain).
The UK’s intention to limit the number of unqualified workers going to the UK in search of work is not favoured by the
Romanian public and authorities, with statements to this effect being made both domestically and at EU level.
Romania looks set to team up with Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states in opposing any UK push to restrict the right
of free movement and more specifically, workers’ rights across the EU.
Agnes Nicolescu – Aspen Institute Romania
Agnes Nicolescu is Public Policy Director at the Aspen Institute Romania. Opinions expressed here are personal and
do not represent those of the Aspen Institute.
_________________________________
Denmark: The Danish government is a firm supporter of UK demands, albeit with some
caveats
David Cameron’s presentation of Britain’s renegotiation demands at the European Council Meeting in
late June 2015 coincided with a change of government in Denmark. This change of government has
had significant implications for the Danish stance on the UK’s renegotiation of its relationship with the
EU. As a result of the Danish general elections on 18 June 2015, the centre-left Social
Democrat/Social Liberal coalition government was replaced by a government consisting only of the
right-wing Liberal Party. The outgoing Prime Minister, the Social Democrat Helle Thorning-Schmidt, represented
Denmark at the European Council Meeting, but her ability to react to David Cameron’s presentation of the British
demands was affected by the incoming government’s different line on British renegotiation.
The former government wanted to keep the UK in the EU, but stressed that Denmark should stay as close as possible
to the EU core. It was also sceptical towards limiting welfare benefits for workers from other EU countries. The new
government has no permanent majority across policy areas but is kept in power by the support of the
Eurosceptic Danish People’s Party, the Eurosceptic New Alliance and a much-reduced Conservative Party, which has
become increasingly sceptical towards EU integration. The four parties had agreed on a common document prior to
the 18 June elections which stressed the need to restrict the access of EU workers to social benefits in other EU
countries and that they would, in general terms, support the UK renegotiation.
These elements found their way into the new Liberal government’s policy programme issued at the end of June. The
Danish Government aimed to ensure that “national welfare systems were not undermined by EU rules”. The
government would “work with like-minded countries in order to revise EU rules on welfare benefits for mobile workers
as soon as possible”. Last but not least, the Danish government would “support the British government’s endeavours
in order for the UK – one of Denmark’s most crucial partners – to remain centrally placed in the EU.”
The post-June Danish government is therefore to be counted as a firm supporter of the British demands for
renegotiations. In the press release just before Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s meeting in Downing Street
on Monday 21 September, it was stressed that Denmark and the UK had many common interests in relation to free-
trade, expansion of the internal market and a strengthening of member states’ competitiveness. It stated that, “we
want to work together with the UK on modernising EU-legislation on welfare benefits”.
Although it has not been expressed directly, it is conceivable that Denmark would be willing to support  the UK on
elements such as its problems with the preamble, protection of rights for non-euro member states and a stronger role
for national parliaments in some form or another. However, there are limits to this Danish support. Denmark does not
want treaty changes. The Danish government still stresses that it wants to stay as close as possible to the EU core.
A referendum will take place in December this year on whether Denmark should replace its exemption on justice and
home affairs with an opt-in possibility to take part in legislation on Justice and Home Affairs – like the UK’s present
arrangement. Denmark – like the UK – does not take part in the EU’s asylum policy and will not do so in the short
term even if it is a yes in December.
The referendum is supported by the traditionally pro-EU parties in the Danish Parliament, including the Conservative
Party. The present Danish government does not want a Danish in-out referendum à la the UK and there is no majority
in the Danish parliament for such a referendum. However, the Danish People’s Party does want a Danish referendum
like the British one and holds up the British endeavours as an example to follow. The British renegotiation has clearly
given impetus to Danish right-wing Euroscepticism.
Henrik Larsen – University of Copenhagen
Professor Henrik Larsen holds the Jean Monnet Chair in European foreign and security integration at the Department
of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.
_________________________________
Belgium: The Belgian view is that European challenges can only be tackled through
deepening European integration
Aside from crises such as that over Greece’s place in the Eurozone or the ongoing refugee situation,
European subjects do no attract much public attention in Belgium. It is therefore not surprising that
the negotiations between the UK and the rest of the EU have not been particularly salient in media
and public debates.
This is not helped by the secrecy surrounding British demands. What is known of the reforms demanded by the British
government remain vague: no domination of the EU by the Eurozone, an opt-out from “ever closer union”, an
increased role for national parliaments, less “red tape” for businesses, more free trade with the rest of the world, and
changes to in-work benefits for EU migrants in the UK.
When Charles Michel, the Belgian Prime Minister, met David Cameron in June, he admitted that the latter had
explained his position and strategy but did not want to unveil it fully. This is of course part of the negotiation game: to
keep one’s position secret while trying to detect the other’s. This also explains the reluctance by the governments of
many member states – with Belgium as no exception – to respond to questions about UK demands.
This being said, the UK position seems to have been welcomed, albeit with some scepticism, by the Belgian
government. If the Belgian Prime Minister showed a clear willingness to listen to Cameron during his tour of European
capitals, he nonetheless expressed important reservations concerning the renegotiation process. While he agreed
that the EU should be reformed to become more competitive and efficient, to fight against social dumping and create
growth and jobs, he insisted that these negotiations should not end up dismantling Europe.
The “red lines” for the Belgian government are therefore that the core European principles of free movement and non-
discrimination should be untouched and that there should be no veto powers granted to national parliaments, since
this would amount to institutional gridlock for the European Union. Charles Michel also warned that the British could
not seek a deal where the UK has only the advantages of belonging to the EU while leaving the inconvenient aspects
for others.
It should be noted here that during the European Council on 25-26 June, the Belgian Prime Minister was the only one
to respond to David Cameron’s comment on his referendum project. He highlighted the importance of involving all
member states and the European commission in this project, in order to avoid Britain trying to present a “fait accompli”
at the December European summit based on limited discussions with only a few member states.
All these statements are consistent with a widespread view in Belgium, particularly within the Liberal party led
government, that numerous current challenges for Europeans can be tackled only if one deepens European
integration. From that perspective, the Belgian foreign affairs Minister Didier Reynders even defends the necessity to
push for European federalism, particularly within the Eurozone. This does not necessarily present an obstacle to
Britain’s desire to distance itself from some of the EU’s policies and institutions. Other member states such as
Germany or France have also indicated they may be willing to accommodate some of Britain’s demands while at the
same time strengthening the governance of the Eurozone.
One of the reasons why the federalist approach, still very much present in Belgian politics, is not at odds with all of
Britain’s desired reforms is that some of them are ideologically attuned to the liberal-conservative agenda of the
current Belgian government. More specifically, the willingness to cut “red tape”, strengthen the single market or
increase trade agreements with the rest of the world is not only very compatible with some current EU policies (the
agenda for “better regulation” for instance or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations). It is
also very much supported by most right wing political groups.
Yet, the Belgian government is a coalition of liberals, social Christians and Flemish nationalists, whose political
agreement involves similar objectives. It might be useful to note here that these demands are the ones that trigger the
most support elsewhere in the EU. Nevertheless, there are internal divisions within the Belgian government on the
issue of migration and non-discrimination. Indeed, Bart de Wever, the leader of the Flemish nationalist Party NVA
(belonging to the same “European Conservatives and Reformists” group as the Conservative Party inside the
European Parliament) has supported the British demand for tough national limitations on migrations within the EU.
Some of these divisions might indicate that the issue of “Brexit” is not only one that can be understood along national
lines, but is an issue that also requires an analysis of ideological convergences and divergences both within and
across member states. This is all the more important since the supranational institutions which could be involved in
designing the reforms wanted by Britain’s Conservatives are characterised by ideological as much as national
opposition.
Sophie Heine – Royal Institute for International Relations
Dr Sophie Heine is a Senior Research Fellow at Egmont, the Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels.
_________________________________
Luxembourg: There is no enthusiasm in Luxembourg for treaty change
Luxembourg, which holds the EU Council Presidency until the end of 2015, has proclaimed that it will
count its 12th EU Presidency a success if it manages to steer the UK towards staying a member of
the EU. The UK demands for a renegotiation represent, along with the Greek and refugee crises, an
additional burden to the successful management of this Presidency for such a small country.
However, it also places Luxembourg at the frontline of the negotiations, giving it the opportunity to
show that its famous negotiation skills were not just due to former Prime Minister Jean-Claude
Juncker, but are a systemic feature of the Luxembourg governmental culture.
For the Luxembourg government, it is clear that the UK should stay in the EU. The Luxembourg government has
stated that, “Keeping the UK in the EU is of strategic importance.” With the UK a big contributor to the EU budget, a
Brexit would mean an increase in Luxembourg’s contributions. Furthermore, the EU would lose some of its clout in
international affairs, which Luxembourg regards as highly detrimental.
The public discussions over a Brexit naturally focus on the impact on the Luxembourg banking industry, as the ties
between the two countries are especially close in this domain. The President of the Luxembourg Banker’s Association
has stated that Luxembourg would lose a close ally in EU negotiations concerning financial markets and taxation.
On the other hand, a study by the Bertelsmann Foundation found that Luxembourg might actually benefit from a
Brexit, as some hedge funds might relocate from the UK to Luxembourg in order to stay in the European market
(although these speculations may have been overstated). Luxembourg has no Eurosceptic parties to speak of;
therefore the debate is framed mostly in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. Britain’s demands for reform have not
triggered any kind of debate in Luxembourg on reform of the EU. Instead, the British are seen as eccentrics who
constantly want to change the rules of the game.
Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, Jean Asselborn, has acknowledged that some reforms to improve the functioning of
the EU could be possible, but without giving any details. Luxembourg is usually open to free trade, so it is in favour of
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and other trade deals. The Luxembourg government has openly
rejected any treaty change, saying it would open a Pandora’s box. If treaty changes were on the table, other countries
would raise their particular demands and, according to Asselborn, “the EU would die”.
This means the founding principles of the EU, such as free movement of people, should not be touched. Luxembourg
counts on Germany and France to stay united on the point of treaty change, these countries being its natural and
strongest allies. The Luxembourg government has supported an enhanced role for national parliaments in EU
decision making. However, it has not made any official comments on the UK’s demand for an opt-out from ‘ever closer
union’ or to changes to in-work benefits for EU migrants in the UK. It may be possible that these demands would not
pose the greatest problems, but the devil is in the details. Any proposal that implies a treaty change is unlikely to be
met with enthusiasm.
Martine Huberty
Dr Martine Huberty is coordinator of the International Association for the Study of German Politics.
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